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Secure quantum weak oblivious transfer against individual measurements
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
In quantum weak oblivious transfer, Alice sends Bob two bits and Bob can learn one of the bits at
his choice. It was found that the security of such a protocol is bounded by 2P ∗Alice+P
∗
Bob ≥ 2, where
P ∗Alice is the probability with which Alice can guess Bob’s choice, and P
∗
Bob is the probability with
which Bob can guess both of Alice’s bits given that he learns one of the bits with certainty. Here
we propose a protocol and show that as long as Alice is restricted to individual measurements, then
both P ∗Alice and P
∗
Bob can be made arbitrarily close to 1/2, so that maximal violation of the security
bound can be reached. Even with some limited collective attacks, the security bound can still be
violated. Therefore, although our protocol still cannot break the bound in principle when Alice has
unlimited cheating power, it is sufficient for achieving secure quantum weak oblivious transfer in
practice.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn, 89.70.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Oblivious transfer (OT) [1, 2] is known to be an essential building block for two-party and multi-party protocols
[3]. However, unconditionally secure OT was shown to be impossible even in quantum cryptography, because the
adversary can always cheat with the so-called honest-but-curious attack [4–8]. To evade the problem, the concept
“weak OT” was proposed recently [9], in which the security goals of OT are slightly modified, so that the honest-but-
curious attack is no longer considered a successful cheating. Even so, it was found that a security bound exists for
weak OT [9], thus it cannot be unconditionally secure either.
Nevertheless, we will point out below that the cheating strategy to weak OT has its own limitation too. By making
use of this limitation, we can build quantum weak OT protocols which will violate the existing security bound when
the cheater is restricted to individual measurements as well as some limited collective attacks. Therefore, while in
principle the security bound still applies to our protocols, in practice the attack will be very difficult to be implemented.
Note that previously there was already a quantum OT protocol [10] which was considered secure against individual
measurements [11]. However, the protocol calls for quantum bit commitment as a building block. Thus its security is
unreliable, as it is widely believed [12, 13] that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment does not exist.
In the next section, we will review the definitions of OT and weak OT, and the existing security bound of the latter.
Our protocol will be proposed in Sect. III. Section IV is dedicated to the security analysis. We will show why the
security bound still applies in principle. On the other hand, we will elaborate how to reach the maximal violation of
the bound when only individual measurements are allowed. It will also be shown that the bound can still be violated
for limited collective attacks. Some ideas on further improvement of our protocol will be discussed in Sect. V. Finally,
in Sect. VI we summarize the result, and explain why it is important in practice to find a secure protocol against
individual measurements.
II. DEFINITIONS AND THE SECURITY BOUND
There are many variations of OT. The most well-known ones are all-or-nothing OT [1] and one-out-of-two OT [2].
Here we are interested in the latter, which is defined as follows [14].
One-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer
(i) Alice knows two bits x0 and x1.
(ii) Bob gets bit xb and not xb¯ with Pr(b = 0) = Pr(b = 1) = 1/2. (Here b¯ denotes the bit-compliment of b.)
(iii) Bob knows which of x0 or x1 he got.
(iv) Alice does not know which xb Bob got.
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2More rigorously, this definition indicates that a secure protocol should guarantee that at the end of the process, Bob
should get xb with reliability 100%, i.e., the value he decoded matches Alice’s actual input with certainty. Meanwhile,
the amount of information he gains on xb¯ should be arbitrarily close to zero, so that he has to guess xb¯ by himself,
which results in a reliability 50% for xb¯ since his guess stands a probability 1/2 to be correct. However, as pointed out
in [15], in the literature there is the lack of a self-consistent definition of OT specifically made for the quantum case.
This is because with quantum methods, it is possible that Bob may accept a lower reliability of learning xb, so that
the reliability for xb¯ can be significantly raised. This is exactly what the honest-but-curious attack [4–7] achieves. In
the above definition it is vague whether such a result is considered as successful cheating, making it hard to discuss
the security of OT protocols in a precise way.
To mend the problem, weak OT is proposed [9], with an improved definition on Bob’s cheating. Define the symbols
P ∗Alice: The maximum probability with which cheating-Alice can get honest-Bob’s choice bit b and honest-Bob does
not abort.
P ∗Bob: The maximum over b ∈ {0, 1} of the probability with which cheating-Bob can get xb¯ given that he gets xb
with certainty and honest-Alice does not abort.
For every protocol there will always be P ∗Alice, P
∗
Bob ≥ 1/2, as a cheating party can do no worse than a random
guess. Then weak OT is defined as a kind of one-out-of-two OT which requires security only against cheating-Bob
who gets one of honest-Alice’s bits with certainty.
Note that the names “Alice” and “Bob” were used reversely in [9], comparing with the literature on QOT [1, 3–
8, 10, 11, 14–17]. Here we follow the literature and use the names in the above way.
It was proven [9] that the optimal security bound for any quantum weak OT protocol is
2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob ≥ 2, (1)
from which it follows that one of the two parties must be able to cheat with probability at least 2/3.
In brief, Ref. [9] obtained this bound with the following method. First, consider Bob’s cheating. Let ρb,x0,x1 denote
the reduced state of his portion of the system. Since a weak OT protocol should allow honest-Bob to learn xb with
certainty, there must be a non-destructive measurement that enables him to do so without disturbing the system.
After Bob learned xb with this measurement, his system will still remain in the state ρb,x0,x1 . To gain some information
on the other bit xb¯, he performs the Helstrom measurement to optimally distinguish the two states corresponding to
xb¯ = 0 and xb¯ = 1, respectively. Thus his cheating can be successful with probability
P ∗Bob ≥
1
2
+
1
8
∆, (2)
where
∆ ≡ 1
2
(
∑
x0∈{0,1}
‖ρ0,x0,0 − ρ0,x0,1‖Tr +
∑
x1∈{0,1}
‖ρ1,0,x1 − ρ1,1,x1‖Tr). (3)
Secondly, consider Alice’s cheating. She implements a uniform superposition over x0, x1 of honest strategies by
introducing two additional private qubits for storing the values of x0 and x1. Then she applies the controlled-unitary
operations
controlled− U0 : |ψ1,1,x1〉 |1〉 |x1〉 → (IA ⊗ U0,x1) |ψ1,1,x1〉 |1〉 |x1〉 (4)
and
controlled− U1 : |ψ0,x0,1〉 |x0〉 |1〉 → (IA ⊗ U1,x0) |ψ0,x0,1〉 |x0〉 |1〉 (5)
for x1 ∈ {0, 1} and x0 ∈ {0, 1}, respectively, where U0,x1 and U1,x0 satisfy
F (ρ1,0,x1 , ρ1,1,x1) = 〈ψ1,0,x1 | (IA ⊗ U0,x1) |ψ1,1,x1〉 ,
F (ρ0,x0,0, ρ0,x0,1) = 〈ψ0,x0,0| (IA ⊗ U1,x0) |ψ0,x0,1〉 . (6)
Here F (ρ, ξ) ≡ ∥∥√ρ√ξ∥∥
Tr
is the fidelity between ρ and ξ. Then the successful probability for her cheating was shown
[9] to be
P ∗Alice ≥
1
2
+
1
16
F, (7)
3where
F ≡
∑
x0∈{0,1}
F (ρ0,x0,0, ρ0,x0,1) +
∑
x1∈{0,1}
F (ρ1,0,x1 , ρ1,1,x1). (8)
Combining the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities
1− 1
2
‖ρ− ξ‖Tr ≤ F (ρ, ξ) ≤
√
1− 1
4
‖ρ− ξ‖2Tr (9)
with equations (2) and (7), the security bound 2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob ≥ 2 is finally obtained.
This bound was also shown to be optimal, as Ref. [9] exhibited a family of protocols whose cheating probabilities
can be made arbitrarily close to any point on the P ∗Alice versus P
∗
Bob tradeoff curve.
III. THE PROTOCOL
A. Limitation of the cheating strategy in existing protocols
Intriguingly, while the security bound 2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob ≥ 2 indicates that in a protocol where Bob cannot cheat
(i.e., P ∗Bob = 1/2), Alice can guess Bob’s choice b at least with the probability P
∗
Alice = 3/4, we must note that her
cheating strategy has a serious drawback. That is, once Alice applies the cheating, she will not be able to determine
the values of x0, x1. For example, consider the Chailloux-Kerenidis-Sikora (CKS) protocol proposed in Sect. 4 of [8]
(also presented in Sect. 3.2 of [9] with reverse usage of the names “Alice” and “Bob”), as described below.
The CKS protocol
1. Bob randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and prepares the two-qutrit state |φb〉 = (|bb〉+ |22〉)/
√
2. He sends one of the
qutrits to Alice.
2. Alice chooses x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and applies the unitary transformation |0〉 → (−1)x0 |0〉, |1〉 → (−1)x1 |1〉, |2〉 → |2〉
on Bob’s qutrit.
3. Alice returns the qutrit to Bob who now has the state |ψb〉 = [(−1)xb |bb〉+ |22〉]/
√
2.
4. Bob performs the measurement {Π0 = |φb〉 〈φb| ,Π1 = |φ′b〉 〈φ′b| , I − Π0 − Π1} on the state |ψb〉, where |φ′b〉 =
(|bb〉 − |22〉)/√2.
5. If the outcome is Π0 then Bob learns with certainty that xb = 0, if it is Π1 then xb = 1, otherwise he aborts.
This protocol can reach P ∗Bob = 1/2, but it is insecure against Alice’s individual attacks. As shown in Sect. 4 of
[8], Alice’s optimal cheating strategy is simply to measure the qutrit she received in step 2 using the computational
basis. If she gets outcome |0〉 (|1〉) then she knows with certainty that b = 0 (b = 1). If she gets outcome |2〉 then
she guesses the value of b. Therefore on average, Alice can learn Bob’s b correctly with the probability P ∗Alice = 3/4.
After the measurement she returns the measured qutrit to Bob. Then Bob’s state will be either |bb〉 or |22〉. With
any of these two states, the outcome of Bob’s measurement in step 4 will always be either Π0 or Π1. Hence he will
never abort, so that Alice’s cheating cannot be detected at all.
However, we can see that Alice cannot control, nor she can learn what will be the actual outcome of Bob’s mea-
surement in step 4, because |bb〉 and |22〉 can both be projected as Π0 or Π1. As a result, at the end of the protocol
Bob gets a bit xb, but its value is unknown to Alice. That is, once dishonest-Alice gains the information on b, she
loses the information on xb. Now we prove that this result is general for any Alice’s cheating strategy.
Theorem 1: In the CKS protocol, Alice cannot learn xb with reliability 1 and gain a non-trivial amount of
information on b simultaneously, while escaping Bob’s detection with probability 1.
Proof: Let α denote the ancillary system that dishonest-Alice introduced for her cheating, system β denote the
qutrit that she received and then returns to Bob, and system β′ denote the qutrit that Bob always keeps at his side.
To ensure that Bob will never abort in step 5 so that Alice can pass Bob’s detection with probability 1, the state of
β ⊗ β′ at this stage must be completely contained in the Hilbert space supported by |φb〉ββ′ and |φ′b〉ββ′ . Therefore,
for any Alice’s cheating strategy, at the end of step 3 the general form of the quantum system shared by Alice and
Bob can always be written as
T (|eini〉α |φb〉ββ′) = λ(0)b
∣∣∣e(0)b
〉
α
|φb〉ββ′ + λ(1)b
∣∣∣e(1)b
〉
α
|φ′b〉ββ′ , (10)
4for b = 0, 1, with |eini〉α (
∣∣∣e(0)b
〉
α
and
∣∣∣e(1)b
〉
α
) being the normalized initial (final) state(s) of α,
∣∣∣λ(0)b
∣∣∣2 +
∣∣∣λ(1)b
∣∣∣2 = 1,
and T is the operator that Alice applies for her cheating. Also, in step (4) of the protocol, Bob learns that xb = 0
(xb = 1) if he gets |φb〉ββ′ (|φ′b〉ββ′). Therefore, if Alice wants to be able to learn xb with reliability 1, she has to
choose an operation T which can ensure that
∣∣∣e(0)b
〉
α
and
∣∣∣e(1)b
〉
α
are orthogonal.
By substituting |φb〉ββ′ = (|bb〉ββ′ + |22〉ββ′)/
√
2 and |φ′b〉ββ′ = (|bb〉ββ′ − |22〉ββ′)/
√
2 into equation (10), we can
rewrite it as
T (|eini〉α |φb〉ββ′) = (|fb〉α |bb〉ββ′ + |f ′b〉α |22〉ββ′)/
√
2, (11)
where
|fb〉α ≡ λ(0)b
∣∣∣e(0)b
〉
α
+ λ
(1)
b
∣∣∣e(1)b
〉
α
,
|f ′b〉α ≡ λ(0)b
∣∣∣e(0)b
〉
α
− λ(1)b
∣∣∣e(1)b
〉
α
, (12)
To gain a non-trivial amount of information on b, equation (11) indicates that Alice needs to distinguish the reduced
density matrices
ρb=0 ≡ (|f0〉α 〈f0|+ |f ′0〉α 〈f ′0|)/2 (13)
and
ρb=1 ≡ (|f1〉α 〈f1|+ |f ′1〉α 〈f ′1|)/2. (14)
While there could exist an operation T , which can ensure ρb=0 6= ρb=1 before Alice obtains xb, we will show below
that after Alice performed any operation M that can make her learn xb with reliability 1, ρb=0 and ρb=1 will become
equal to each other, so that they cannot be distinguished any more.
An important fact is that qutrit β′ is always kept at Bob’s side, so that it remains unchanged under Alice operation
T . Thus we can write T = Uαβ ⊗ Iβ′ , where Uαβ applies on systems α and β only, while Iβ′ is the identity operator
on β′. Denoting
Uαβ(|eini〉α |0〉β) = |Ψ0〉αβ ,
Uαβ(|eini〉α |1〉β) = |Ψ1〉αβ ,
Uαβ(|eini〉α |2〉β) = |Ψ2〉αβ , (15)
then we have
T (|eini〉α |φb〉ββ′) = (Uαβ ⊗ Iβ′)(|eini〉α (|bb〉ββ′ + |22〉ββ′)/
√
2)
= (|Ψb〉αβ |b〉β′ + |Ψ2〉αβ |2〉β′)/
√
2). (16)
Comparing with equation (11), we yield
|Ψb〉αβ = |fb〉α |b〉β ,
|Ψ2〉αβ = |f ′b〉α |2〉β . (17)
The latter indicates that |f ′b〉α does not depend on b, i.e.,
|f ′0〉α = |f ′1〉α . (18)
Then
〈f ′0 |f ′1〉α = 1. (19)
With equation (12) we know
〈f ′0 |f ′1〉α = (λ(0)∗0
〈
e
(0)
0
∣∣∣
α
− λ(1)∗0
〈
e
(1)
0
∣∣∣
α
)(λ
(0)
1
∣∣∣e(0)1
〉
α
− λ(1)1
∣∣∣e(1)1
〉
α
)
= λ
(0)∗
0 λ
(0)
1
〈
e
(0)
0
∣∣∣e(0)1
〉
α
− λ(0)∗0 λ(1)1
〈
e
(0)
0
∣∣∣e(1)1
〉
α
−λ(1)∗0 λ(0)1
〈
e
(1)
0
∣∣∣e(0)1
〉
α
+ λ
(1)∗
0 λ
(1)
1
〈
e
(1)
0
∣∣∣e(1)1
〉
α
(20)
5and
〈f0 |f1〉α = (λ(0)∗0
〈
e
(0)
0
∣∣∣
α
+ λ
(1)∗
0
〈
e
(1)
0
∣∣∣
α
)(λ
(0)
1
∣∣∣e(0)1
〉
α
+ λ
(1)
1
∣∣∣e(1)1
〉
α
)
= λ
(0)∗
0 λ
(0)
1
〈
e
(0)
0
∣∣∣e(0)1
〉
α
+ λ
(0)∗
0 λ
(1)
1
〈
e
(0)
0
∣∣∣e(1)1
〉
α
+λ
(1)∗
0 λ
(0)
1
〈
e
(1)
0
∣∣∣e(0)1
〉
α
+ λ
(1)∗
0 λ
(1)
1
〈
e
(1)
0
∣∣∣e(1)1
〉
α
. (21)
Now if Alice performs any operationM on the state T (|eini〉α |φb〉ββ′) so that xb (b = 0, 1) is obtained with reliability
1, the final state can still be written as equation (10), except that the coefficients λ
(0)
0 , λ
(1)
0 , λ
(0)
1 and λ
(1)
1 cannot stay
non-vanishing simultaneously. Instead, one of λ
(0)
0 and λ
(1)
0 must become zero, and one of λ
(0)
1 and λ
(1)
1 must be zero
too. In this case, we can see that in the right hand side of either equation (20) or (21), only one of the coefficients
before the four terms
〈
e
(0)
0
∣∣∣e(0)1
〉
α
,
〈
e
(0)
0
∣∣∣e(1)1
〉
α
,
〈
e
(1)
0
∣∣∣e(0)1
〉
α
and
〈
e
(1)
0
∣∣∣e(1)1
〉
α
can remain non-vanishing. No matter
which single term remains, there will always be either
〈f0 |f1〉α = 〈f ′0 |f ′1〉α . (22)
or
〈f0 |f1〉α = −〈f ′0 |f ′1〉α . (23)
Combining with equation (19), they both give
|f0〉α 〈f0| = |f1〉α 〈f1| . (24)
Substituting it and equation (18) into equations (13) and (14), we finally obtain
ρb=0 = ρb=1. (25)
Thus they provide absolutely zero knowledge on b. Therefore, once Alice performs the operation to learn xb with
reliability 1, she can no longer gain any information on b. This ends the proof of Theorem 1.
The above proof does not exclude the existence of other cheating strategies, in which Alice can learn xb with a
reliability less than 1, and/or Bob may abort in step 5 with a non-vanishing probability. But this will do no harm to
our purpose, as it will be shown later in Sects. IV.B and IV.C.
In fact, besides the CKS protocol, some other QOT protocols [16, 17] also display the same feature described in
Theorem 1. Let (3/4, 1/2)-protocol denote any QOT protocol of this kind, i.e., both P ∗Alice = 3/4 and P
∗
Bob = 1/2 are
satisfied exactly, and Alice cannot determine xb with reliability 1 once she gain a non-trivial amount of information on
b. It will be shown below that though a (3/4, 1/2)-protocol merely saturates the security bound 2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob ≥ 2,
it can be utilized to construct a compound protocol which can eventually violate this bound when Alice is limited to
individual attacks.
B. Our protocol
Our method is to use such a (3/4, 1/2)-protocol as a building block, with which Alice transfers a series of bits x
(i)
0 ,
x
(i)
1 (not the final x0, x1 that she wants to transfer) to Bob. The values of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 are not completely random.
Instead, they must be chosen according to a certain rule. Then Bob uses many of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 to check whether Alice
can determine their values correctly. Finally he uses one of the remaining pairs of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 and asks Alice to encode
her x0, x1. The general form of the protocol is as follows.
Protocol A: weak OT for transferring (x0, x1)
A1. Alice and Bob discuss and agree on a set S of classical n-bit strings.
A2. Alice randomly chooses two strings
X0 = x
(1)
0 x
(2)
0 ...x
(i)
0 ...x
(n)
0 and X1 = x
(1)
1 x
(2)
1 ...x
(i)
1 ...x
(n)
1 from S. Note that at this stage, none of these x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 have
any specific relationship with the two final bits x0, x1 (we call them as target bits thereafter) that Alice wants to
transfer to Bob as the goal of the weak OT.
6A3. For each i (i = 1, ..., n), Alice transfers x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 to Bob using a (3/4, 1/2)-protocol. Bob randomly chooses
bi ∈ {0, 1} and decodes xbi .
A4. Security check: among all these n runs of the (3/4, 1/2)-protocol, Bob picks m (m < n) runs randomly. For
each of these runs, he asks Alice to announce x
(i)
0 and x
(i)
1 , and checks whether they are consistent with the value of
xbi that he obtained in the (3/4, 1/2)-protocol. He also checks that there is at least two strings X
′
0 and X
′
1 in set S,
such that all the m bits x
(i)
0 (x
(i)
1 ) that Alice announced are contained in X
′
0 (X
′
1).
A5. If Alice’s announced values pass the above check, Bob picks one of the remaining n−m unchecked runs (which
is denoted as the iˆ-th run) of the (3/4, 1/2)-protocol. This run should satisfy the requirement that x
(ˆi)
0 = 0, x
(ˆi)
0 = 1,
x
(ˆi)
1 = 0, and x
(ˆi)
1 = 1 are all allowed by set S. That is, in set S there is at least one string which contains all the m
bits x
(i)
0 (x
(i)
1 ) that Alice announced in step A4 and x
(ˆi)
0 = 0 (x
(ˆi)
1 = 0), and an equal number of strings, each of which
also contains all these m bits x
(i)
0 (x
(i)
1 ) but with x
(ˆi)
0 = 1 (x
(ˆi)
1 = 1) instead. This guarantees that the m bits x
(i)
0
(x
(i)
1 ) announced in step A4 are insufficient for Bob to deduce the value of x
(ˆi)
0 (x
(ˆi)
1 ) from set S. Alice checks that
this requirement is met after Bob told her the value of iˆ.
A6. Alice completes the weak OT by using the iˆ-th run of the (3/4, 1/2)-protocol to encode the target bits x0, x1.
That is, she announces x0 ⊕ x(ˆi)0 and x1⊕ x(ˆi)1 to Bob. Thus Bob can obtain either x0 or x1 depending on whether he
has obtained x
(ˆi)
0 or x
(ˆi)
1 in the iˆ-th run of the (3/4, 1/2)-protocol.
C. A concrete example
To make our protocol easier for understanding and analyzing, here we provide a concrete example of our above
protocol where the CKS protocol is used as the (3/4, 1/2)-protocol and the explicit form of set S is given.
Protocol B: a concrete example
B1. Alice and Bob run the CKS protocol for n = 3k times. Every 3 runs of the CKS protocol are grouped together
and we call it as a triple run. Let x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 (i = 1, 2, 3) denote the bits that Alice transfers to Bob in a triple run.
The values of the strings X0 = x
(1)
0 x
(2)
0 x
(3)
0 and X1 = x
(1)
1 x
(2)
1 x
(3)
1 cannot be completely random. Instead, they are
required to be chosen within the set S = {000, 001, 010, 100}.
B2. Security check: for every triple run, Bob randomly picks two runs of the CKS protocol, denotes them as the
i1-th and i2-th runs. The remaining run that is not picked is denoted as the i3-th run. Bob asks Alice to reveal x
(i1)
0 ,
x
(i1)
1 and x
(i2)
0 , x
(i2)
1 . If x
(i1)
0 = x
(i1)
1 = x
(i2)
0 = x
(i2)
1 = 0 then Bob marks the corresponding triple run as a useful run,
as both x
(i3)
0 and x
(i3)
1 can either be 0 or 1 according to the definition of set S, so that they may potentially be used
for encoding the target bits x0, x1 later. Else if any of x
(i1)
0 , x
(i1)
1 , x
(i2)
0 , x
(i2)
1 is 1, Bob asks Alice to reveal x
(i3)
0 , x
(i3)
1
too, and checks whether both X0 = x
(1)
0 x
(2)
0 x
(3)
0 and X1 = x
(1)
1 x
(2)
1 x
(3)
1 belong to set S. He also checks that none of
Alice’s announced values conflicts with what he decoded from the CKS protocol.
B3. If Alice’s data passes the above check, Bob picks one of the useful runs and asks Alice to complete the weak
OT using this run. Then Alice announces x0 ⊕ x(i3)0 and x1 ⊕ x(i3)1 to Bob, so that he can obtain either the target bit
x0 or x1 depending on whether he has obtained x
(i3)
0 or x
(i3)
1 in the corresponding run of the CKS protocol.
B4. For better security, Bob can further ask Alice to reveal x
(i3)
0 and x
(i3)
1 of all the rest useful runs which are not
picked in step B3. Then he checks whether they conflict with what he decoded from the CKS protocol.
IV. SECURITY
A. The collective attack
The above protocols A and B are, unfortunately, still restricted by the security bound 2P ∗Alice+P
∗
Bob ≥ 2 if Alice has
unlimited computational power to apply collective attacks. Taking Protocol B as an example, her cheating strategy
is as follows.
7In step B1, for each triple run Alice introduces a 6-qubit system C = c
(1)
0 c
(2)
0 c
(3)
0 c
(1)
1 c
(2)
1 c
(3)
1 to keep her choice of
the strings X0 = x
(1)
0 x
(2)
0 x
(3)
0 and X1 = x
(1)
1 x
(2)
1 x
(3)
1 at the quantum level. The state of system C is initialized as∣∣∣c(1)0 c(2)0 c(3)0 c(1)1 c(2)1 c(3)1
〉
=
1
2
(|000〉+ |001〉+ |010〉+ |100〉)
⊗1
2
(|000〉+ |001〉+ |010〉+ |100〉), (26)
where the first (last) three qubits are corresponding to the string X0 (X1). That is, it is a superposition of all the
states allowed by set S.
In the i-th run (i = 1, 2, 3) of the CKS protocol during a triple run, let β(i) denote the qutrit that Bob sent to
Alice, taken from his two-qutrit state
∣∣∣φ(i)b
〉
= (|bb〉+ |22〉)/√2. Alice uses c(i)0 , c(i)1 as control qubits to determine her
transformation on β(i). That is, on c
(i)
0 ⊗ c(i)1 ⊗ β(i) she applies the unitary transformation
T
c
(i)
0 c
(i)
1 β
(i) =
1∑
x
(i)
0 ,x
(i)
1 =0
(
∣∣∣x(i)0
〉
c
(i)
0
〈
x
(i)
0
∣∣∣⊗
∣∣∣x(i)1
〉
c
(i)
1
〈
x
(i)
1
∣∣∣
⊗


(−1)x(i)0 0 0
0 (−1)x(i)1 0
0 0 1


β(i)
). (27)
By doing so, Alice manages to finish the transformation |0〉 → (−1)x0 |0〉, |1〉 → (−1)x1 |1〉, |2〉 → |2〉 on Bob’s qutrit
β(i), just as it is required in the CKS protocol when Alice is honest. The only difference is that in the current case,
x
(i)
0 and x
(i)
1 do not have deterministic classical values. Instead, they are kept at the quantum level.
In step B2 whenever Bob picks one run of the CKS protocol and asks Alice to reveal the corresponding x
(i)
0 and
x
(i)
1 , Alice measures the qubits c
(i)
0 and c
(i)
1 in the computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. If the result is |0〉 (|1〉) then she
announces the corresponding x
(i)
0 or x
(i)
1 as 0 (1). From equation (27) it can be seen that Alice’s announcement will
never conflict with the values Bob decodes from the CKS protocol. Now recall that a useful run is defined as the
triple run where x
(i1)
0 = x
(i1)
1 = x
(i2)
0 = x
(i2)
1 = 0. Therefore by combining equations (26) and (27), we know that the
state of c
(i3)
0 ⊗ c(i3)1 ⊗ φ(i3)b of any useful run at the end of step B2 becomes∣∣∣c(i3)0 ⊗ c(i3)1 ⊗ φ(i3)b
〉
=
1
2
1∑
x
(i3)
0 ,x
(i3)
1 =0
{
∣∣∣x(i3)0
〉
c
(i3)
0
⊗
∣∣∣x(i3)1
〉
c
(i3)
1
⊗ 1√
2
[(−1)x(i3)b |bb〉+ |22〉]}. (28)
If a useful run is picked for the security check in step B4, Alice can simply measure the qubits c
(i3)
0 and c
(i3)
1 in
the basis {|0〉 , |1〉} and reveal x(i3)0 and x(i3)1 correctly. On the other hand, if a useful run is picked in step B3 to
encode Alice’s target bits x0, x1, then she will have the freedom to choose whether to measure c
(i3)
0 and c
(i3)
1 in the
basis {|0〉 , |1〉} and learn the values of x0, x1 as an honest Alice does, or to learn the value of Bob’s b with a certain
probability instead. In the latter case, she measures c
(i3)
0 and c
(i3)
1 in the basis {|+〉 , |−〉}, where |±〉 = (|0〉± |1〉)/
√
2.
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∣∣∣c(i3)
b¯
⊗ c(i3)b ⊗ φ(i3)b
〉
=
1
2
1∑
x
(i3)
b
=0
{(
1∑
x
(i3)
b¯
=0
∣∣∣x(i3)
b¯
〉
c
(i3)
b¯
)⊗
∣∣∣x(i3)b
〉
c
(i3)
b
⊗ 1√
2
[(−1)x(i3)b |bb〉+ |22〉]}
=
1√
2
|+〉
c
(i3)
b¯
⊗
1∑
x
(i3)
b
=0
{
∣∣∣x(i3)b
〉
c
(i3)
b
⊗ 1√
2
[(−1)x(i3)b |bb〉+ |22〉]}
=
1√
2
|+〉
c
(i3)
b¯
⊗ [|−〉
c
(i3)
b
⊗ |bb〉+ |+〉
c
(i3)
b
⊗ |22〉]. (29)
We can see that if Alice finds the outcome of her measurement on c
(i3)
0 (c
(i3)
1 ) is |−〉, then she knows with certainty
that Bob’s choice is b = 0 (b = 1). This will occur with the probability 1/2. On the other 1/2 case, the outcomes of
Alice’s measurements on both c
(i3)
0 and c
(i3)
1 are |+〉, thus she has to guess the value of b by herself. Therefore, the
average probability that Alice can learn Bob’s b correctly is still P ∗Alice = 3/4, which is the same as that of the original
CKS protocol. As there is always P ∗Bob ≥ 1/2 for any protocol, we can see that the security bound 2P ∗Alice+P ∗Bob ≥ 2
still holds in the current case.
B. Security against individual attacks
However, the above cheating requires the computational power to perform collective operations on many
qubits/qutrits. More rigorously, equations (26) and (27) indicate that at the end of step B1, in every triple run
Alice needs to make 6 qubits and 3 qutrits entangled together, even if Bob’s half of his two-qutrit states is not
counted. Here we will show that if Alice is limited to individual measurements, then the protocol can be secure.
In this scenario, during each run of the CKS protocol, Alice is not allowed to perform collective operations to
entangle the qutrit β she received from Bob with her quantum ancillary system anymore. What she can do is to
handle β individually. In general, such operations can be modeled as a channel Cαβ which takes β as an input, then
outputs a single qutrit state and a classical register α containing her measurement outcome. The effect of the channel
Cαβ can be written as
Cαβ(|eini〉α |j〉β) =
2∑
j′=0
λjj′ |ejj′ 〉α |j′〉β , (30)
where j = 0, 1, 2, and |eini〉α (|ejj′ 〉α) is the initial (final) state of α. Comparing with equations (10) and (15), we
can see that Cαβ is actually a special case of the general cheating operation T studied in the proof of Theorem 1.
The specialty in the current case is that α is classical, while in equation (10) it can be either classical or quantum.
Therefore, by formulating the resultant state of Cαβ as equation (10) and repeating the same proof in Sect. III.A,
we find that the result of Theorem 1 still applies here. That is, if Alice can guess b with nonzero bias by applying
channel Cαβ to Bob’s qutrit β and Bob never aborts, then she cannot learn xb with reliability 1.
Moreover, as α is a classical register, there will be no alternative bases for measuring it. That is, once Alice decides
on what kind of channel to apply, then the measurement basis for α is also fixed. No matter when Alice will measure
α and extract the information stored in it, this information is already a deterministic classical object after the channel
is applied, and there is only one choice of the basis for extracting it. This is different from an unlimited quantum
attack, where Alice can apply the cheating operation and delay the measurement, then at a later time, if she wants
to learn xb, she measures α in a certain basis, while if she wants to learn b, she measures α in another basis. In the
current case, even if the measurement could be delayed, there is only one basis for Alice (otherwise it will become a
collective attack). Therefore, Alice needs to determine beforehand which basis to use, and picks the corresponding
channel to apply. Dishonest-Alice will surely choose a basis which enables her to learn Bob’s b with a nonzero bias,
because this is the goal of her cheating. But then Theorem 1 guarantees that she cannot know with certainty the
9value of xb that Bob actually obtained. Consequently, if this run of the CKS protocol is picked for the security check
in Protocol B, Alice will stand a non-vanishing probability ε to either announce a wrong value of xb or cause Bob to
abort (in case his measurement outcome is neither Π0 nor Π1 in step 5 of the CKS protocol).
Now suppose that Alice chooses to cheat in pn (1/n ≤ p ≤ 1) runs of the CKS protocol. While Alice can apply
different strategies in these runs so that the value of ε can vary, we can define εm as the minimum of ε in any run
that Alice cheats. Thus 1− εm is the maximal probability for Alice to pass Bob’s check in a single run. Since at the
end of Protocol B, n− 1 runs of the CKS protocol will be checked, there can be two possibilities.
(I) The only one run that is not checked is picked among the pn runs that Alice cheats. Since this run is used for
encoding the target bits in step B3, Alice can gain a non-trivial amount of information on b. As the CKS protocol
ensures that Alice can learn b correctly with the probability 3/4 at the most, and the other pn − 1 runs that Alice
cheats are all checked, the maximal probability for Alice to learn b correctly and pass the checks successfully in this
case is
P IAlice ≤
3
4
(1 − εm)pn−1. (31)
(II) The only one run that is not checked is not picked among the pn runs that Alice cheats. As Alice acts honestly
in this run, she can only get b by guess, which can be correct with the probability 1/2. Meanwhile, all the pn runs that
Alice cheats are checked. Thus the maximal probability for Alice to learn b correctly and pass the checks successfully
in this case is
P IIAlice ≤
1
2
(1− εm)pn. (32)
Note that cases (I) and (II) occur with the probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively. Thus the total probability for
Alice to pass the check while learning b correctly is
P ∗Alice = pP
I
Alice + (1− p)P IIAlice
≤ 3
4
p(1− εm)pn−1 + 1
2
(1− p)(1 − εm)pn. (33)
Since
∂
∂p
(
3
4
p(1− εm)pn−1 + 1
2
(1− p)(1− εm)pn)
= ((
3
4
p+
1
2
(1 − p)(1− εm))n ln(1− εm)
+
3
4
− 1
2
(1− εm))(1 − εm)pn−1
< 0, (34)
higher P ∗Alice can be obtained by lowering p. The lowest nonzero p is p = 1/n, i.e., Alice cheats in pn = 1 run only
and hopes that she is so lucky that this run is finally picked for encoding the target bits. In this case
P ∗Alice ≤
1
2
+
1
4n
− εm
2
(1− 1
n
)
≤ 1
2
+
1
4n
. (35)
As a result, for any arbitrarily small positive constant ζ, Bob can choose n > 1/(4ζ) and ask Alice to perform the
corresponding Protocol B, which can achieve P ∗Alice < 1/2 + ζ.
On the other hand, Bob’s cheating probability remains the same as that of the CKS protocol. This is because
in any useful run, the values of x
(i1)
0 , x
(i1)
1 , x
(i2)
0 , x
(i2)
1 that Alice revealed are always 0. As set S is defined as
S = {000, 001, 010, 100}, any value of x(i3)0 and x(i3)1 remains possible to Bob unless Alice reveals them. Thus the
values of x
(i1)
0 , x
(i1)
1 , x
(i2)
0 , x
(i2)
1 in a useful run do not provide any information for Bob to deduce x
(i3)
0 and x
(i3)
1 .
Also, the values of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 in different triple runs are chosen independently, so that the specific x
(i3)
0 , x
(i3)
1 finally
chosen for encoding the target bits x0, x1 are not affected by any x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 from all the other runs. Consequently,
Bob still has to decode the target bits via the corresponding run of the CKS protocol, without any help from other
runs. Therefore, his cheating probability in our Protocol B is still P ∗Bob = 1/2, as what can be obtained in a single
run of the original CKS protocol [8].
Putting things together, we can see that when Alice is limited to individual measurements, in our Protocol B
2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob can be made arbitrarily close to 3/2, which is the maximal violation of the security bound 2P
∗
Alice +
P ∗Bob ≥ 2 since the minimums for P ∗Alice and P ∗Bob are both 1/2.
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C. Security against limited collective attacks
If Alice is allowed to perform collective operations but it is restricted to a limited number of quantum systems only,
then the security bound 2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob ≥ 2 can also be violated to a certain degree.
Here we consider the case where Alice’s collective operations are limited to the quantum systems in the same run
of the CKS protocol only, i.e., the qutrit β(i) that Bob sends to her and the ancillary system she introduces (e.g.,
it can contain the two control qubits c
(i)
0 , c
(i)
1 for keeping x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 at the quantum level). She can still apply the
transformation defined in equation (27) or other operations on these systems for cheating. Our discussion below will
remain valid as long as this ancillary system cannot be entangled with the ancillary system for any other run (e.g.,
equation (26) is not allowed).
In this scenario, since the potential cheating strategies could be innumerous and much more complicated than the
individual attacks, it is hard to prove the exact security bound of our protocol. But at least here we can obtain
the loose upper and lower bounds of the security, which is 5/3 ≤ 2P ∗Alice + P ∗Bob < 2. It means that the probability
for successful cheatings is higher than that of the individual attacks, but it still violates the security bound for the
unlimited collective attack.
Let us prove the upper bound 2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob < 2 first. After the end of step B1, from Alice’s point of view, the
general form of the state of Alice’s and Bob’s combined system for each single run of the CKS protocol is
|α⊗ β ⊗ β′〉 = λ(0)b
∣∣∣e(0)b
〉
α
|φb〉ββ′ + λ(1)b
∣∣∣e(1)b
〉
α
|φ′b〉ββ′
+λ
(2)
b
∣∣∣e(2)b ⊗ φ′′b
〉
αββ′
, (36)
where the notations are the same as those in the proof of Theorem 1, with the additional
∣∣∣e(2)b ⊗ φ′′b
〉
αββ′
, which
represents the state orthogonal to both
∣∣∣e(0)b
〉
α
|φb〉ββ′ and
∣∣∣e(1)b
〉
α
|φ′b〉ββ′ . Note that the actual system may already
collapse to one of the terms at the right hand side of the equation due to Bob’s measurement on β ⊗ β′. But Alice
can still treat the whole state as the entangled form in this equation if she has not measured α. This is because
Alice’s and Bob’s local operations are commutable for the entangled system α ⊗ β ⊗ β′, so that it does not matter
mathematically who performs the measurement first.
Since Bob learns that x
(i)
b = 0 (x
(i)
b = 1) if he gets |φb〉ββ′ (|φ′b〉ββ′), otherwise he aborts, the above equation can
be understood as
|α⊗ β ⊗ β′〉 = λ(0)b
∣∣∣e(0)b
〉
α
∣∣∣x(i)b = 0
〉
ββ′
+ λ
(1)
b
∣∣∣e(1)b
〉
α
∣∣∣x(i)b = 1
〉
ββ′
+λ
(2)
b
∣∣∣e(2)b ⊗ abort
〉
αββ′
, (37)
Comparing with equation (10), it is even more general since it also includes the case where Bob may abort. Now if
none of the coefficients λ
(0)
b and λ
(1)
b equals exactly to 1, then the value of x
(i)
b is kept at the quantum level. That is,
it will be determined by the uncertainty in quantum measurement, so that Alice cannot control with certainty which
value can be obtained by Bob. Else if one of λ
(0)
b and λ
(1)
b equals exactly to 1, then the other one and λ
(2)
b obviously
have to be zero, and the value of x
(i)
b becomes classically deterministic.
After the end of step B1, suppose that the values of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 in pn (n = 3k, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1) runs of the CKS protocol in
Protocol B are kept at the quantum level (the values of λ
(0)
b and λ
(1)
b depend on Alice’s specific strategy, which can be
different in each run). In the rest (1− p)n runs, x(i)0 , x(i)1 are no longer kept at the quantum level after step B1, but
take deterministic classical values instead, so that Alice can ensure that the values of both X0 and X1 are presented
in set S. Then these (1− p)n runs are in fact executed honestly, as Theorem 1 ensures that Alice cannot use them to
decode Bob’s b. She can get b only if one of the other pn runs of the CKS protocol dishonestly executed is picked in
step B3 for encoding the target bits x0 and x1 to complete the weak OT. This will occur with the probability p. Even
if Alice uses the optimal cheating strategy so that she can still learn Bob’s b with the probability 3/4 (which is the
maximum that can be obtained in the CKS protocol) for such a single dishonest run, the probability for (this run to
be chosen) and (b is learned correctly) will drop down to (3/4)p. If any other non-optimal cheating strategy was used
in this run, the probability is limited by this value too. In the rest (1−p) occasions where one of the (1−p)n honestly
executed runs is chosen for encoding the target bits, Alice can only get Bob’s b by guessing which has probability 1/2
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to be correct. Therefore, the total probability for Alice to cheat successfully in our Protocol B is bounded by
P ∗Alice = [
3
4
p+
1
2
(1 − p)]pc
= (
1
2
+
1
4
p)pc, (38)
where pc is the probability that Alice can pass the security checks. Finding the tight bound for P
∗
Alice requires a
rigorous evaluation of pc, which will depend on the specific cheating strategy Alice applies on the pn runs. But we
can show that there will always be P ∗Alice < 3/4. This is because if p < 1, for a loose evaluation we can simply take
the maximum pc = 1 which surely covers any strategy. Then P
∗
Alice = 1/2 + p/4 < 3/4. On the other hand, consider
the case p = 1. As the collective attacks are limited to the quantum systems in each single run of the CKS protocol,
the values of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 in different runs will not correlate with each other. Then in the current case, since x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 in
all the n runs are kept at the quantum level, any one of them can turn out to be either 0 or 1 during the measurement
in the security check. The outcome is determined independently in each single run by quantum uncertainty, thus Bob
cannot ensure with probability 100% that X0 and X1 will always take the legitimate values in set S in every single run
in the security check. Therefore, we have pc < 1 when p = 1. Then equation (38) gives P
∗
Alice = (1/2+ 1/4)pc < 3/4.
Namely, no matter p < 1 or p = 1, P ∗Alice cannot equal exactly to 3/4, i.e., it is always lower than that of the original
CKS protocol.
Meanwhile, Bob’s cheating probability still equals to that of the CKS protocol, i.e., P ∗Bob = 1/2, since the specific
x
(i3)
0 , x
(i3)
1 finally chosen for encoding the target bits x0, x1 are not affected by any x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 from all the other runs,
as it is elaborated in the previous subsection. Combining this P ∗Bob with P
∗
Alice < 3/4, we can see that under the
limited collective attack, our Protocol B can obtain
2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob < 2×
3
4
+
1
2
. (39)
Thus the upper bound 2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob < 2 is proven.
Now we prove the lower bound 2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob ≥ 5/3. This is because there exists the following cheating strategy
for Alice. In every triple run, she only keeps one pair of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 (i = 1, 2, 3) at the quantum level by using the
collective operation described by equation (27). The other two pairs of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 are all taken as 0 beforehand, and
the corresponding two runs of the CKS protocol are executed honestly. Then all triple runs can pass the security
check with certainty. Meanwhile, when a useful run is finally picked for encoding the target bits, the pair x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1
kept at the quantum level stands a probability 1/3 to be chosen. Thus we have p = 1/3. Substitute it into equation
(38) and we yield
2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob =
5
3
, (40)
so that this lower bound can be reached even when Alice is restricted to the limited collective attack. But we do
not know whether this bound is tight at the present moment, as it is unclear whether there may exist an even better
cheating strategy.
V. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
By observing the above cheating strategy that led to the lower bound equation (40), we can see that the probability
p = 1/3 comes from the specific set S used in Protocol B, which is made of 3-bit strings only. In the more general
form, i.e., our Protocol A, we can expect that choosing a more complicated set S may further reduced the value of p.
For example, set S can be chosen as a classical error-correcting code, e.g., the binary linear (n, k, d)-code [18]. That
is, S is taken as a set of classical n-bit strings. Each string is called a codeword. This set of strings has two features.
(a) Among all the 2n possible choices of n-bit strings, only a particular set of the size ∼ 2k (k < n) is selected to
construct this set. (b) The distance (i.e., the number of different bits) between any two codewords in this set is not
less than d (d < n). With these features, it can be expected that by increasing n while fixing k/n and d/n, a dishonest
Alice will have to introduce a much larger number of entangled control qubits for keeping more pairs of x
(i)
0 , x
(i)
1 at
the quantum level, so that X0 = x
(1)
0 x
(2)
0 ...x
(i)
0 ...x
(n)
0 and X1 = x
(1)
1 x
(2)
1 ...x
(i)
1 ...x
(n)
1 will appear as legitimate strings
in set S no matter which bits are picked for the security check. Therefore with a properly chosen S, Protocol A may
further lower the successful probability of limited collective attacks, and also raises the difficulty of implementing
these attacks. However, the rigorous security bound will depend heavily on the structure of the specific set S used in
the protocol. This analysis is left for future research.
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VI. SUMMARY AND REMARKS
Thus we show that the security bound 2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob ≥ 2 for weak OT can be violated for an Alice with limited
computational power. As a rigorously checkable example, we proposed Protocol B which reaches the maximal violation
2P ∗Alice + P
∗
Bob → 3/2 when only individual measurements are allowed. For attacks using collective operations on a
limited number of quantum systems, there can still be P ∗Alice < 3/4 while P
∗
Bob = 1/2. An even lower value of P
∗
Alice
could be expected from Protocol A.
Note that Ref. [9] obtained the security bound without limiting Alice to individual measurements. Thus our
protocols does not really break the bound in principle. But it still has great practical significance. This is because in
practice, any quantum storage devices can keep the quantum states faithfully for a limited time only. Suppose that τ
is the maximal storage time available with state-of-the-art technology. Then during step B1 of Protocol B, Bob can
require that every run of the CKS protocol is separated from each other by a time interval larger than τ , so that any
ancillary system that a dishonest Alice may introduce to entangle with Bob’s qutrit will suffer from errors, making
Alice unable to pass the security check. In this case, Alice has to finish the measurement on Bob’s qutrit (if she does
not want to perform the honest unitary transformation) in each single run of the CKS protocol before the next run
begins. Thus her cheating is actually reduced to individual measurements. So we can see that as long as our protocol
is proven secure against individual measurements, then it naturally implies that we can use it as a secure protocol in
practice.
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